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Self-referential processing is defined as the process by which a person becomes aware
that specific contents are related to his or her own self. Cortical midline structures
(CMS), such as dorsal and medial prefrontal cortex, and regions such as inferior frontal
cortex, insula, and temporal pole have been implicated in self-referential processing.
However, the specific contribution of each of these areas is still largely unknown. More
particularly, not many studies have examined the influence of valence and decision making
difficulty on regions involved in self-referential processing. In this study, participants
evaluated how well personality traits, differing in valence and decision difficulty, described
themselves or the current US President. In line with predictions, ventral, rostral, and dorsal
parts of medial prefrontal cortex showed greater activity when participants judged traits
about themselves relative to judging traits about the current US President. However, none
of these regions showed significant modulation by trait valence. Increasing trait decision
difficulty was associated with increased activity within dorsal medial prefrontal cortex and
bilateral anterior insula. However, there was very minimal overlap (6/119 voxels, i.e., 5%)
of the regions of dorsal medial prefrontal cortex implicated in self-referential processing
and those implicated in trait decision difficulty. The results are interpreted within current
accounts of self-referential processing.
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INTRODUCTION
Self-referential processing is defined as the process by which
a person becomes aware that specific contents are related to
his or her own self (Northoff et al., 2011). Regions implicated
in what has been termed conceptual self-referential processing
(Powell et al., 2010) include cortical midline structures [CMS;
rostral/ventral medial prefrontal cortex (r/vMPFC), posterior cin-
gulate cortex (PCC)/precuneus and, to a lesser extent, dorsal
medial frontal cortex (dMPFC)] (Amodio and Frith, 2006; van
der Meer et al., 2010; Northoff et al., 2011) as well as infe-
rior frontal cortex, insula and the temporal poles (van der Meer
et al., 2010; Northoff et al., 2011). Within the CMS, it appears
that r/vMPFC shows the strongest differentiation between self
and other processing (van der Meer et al., 2010). Indeed, there
have been suggestions that rMPFC is particularly involved in self-
referential processing while more dorsal aspects of the MPFC
may be more important for other-referential thinking (Mitchell
et al., 2006). It is important to remember, however, that CMS
have also been implicated in emotional processing (Etkin et al.,
2011; Lindquist et al., 2012). Self-referential tasks frequently
involve judgments regarding personality traits with high affect.
Moreover, the tasks used to study self-referential processing (e.g.,
asking someone to indicate whether a personality trait applies
to them) have a significant decision making component. The
dMPFC in particular has been implicated in several specific com-
putational processes related to decision making; e.g., conflict
monitoring (Botvinick et al., 2004) and the representation of
response-outcome combinations (Alexander and Brown, 2011).
Varying not only the referential target (self or other) but also
the valence and the difficulty of decision making can help deter-
mine whether regions implicated in self-referential processing are
recruited mainly because of their specific role in self-referential
processing or because of more general roles in affect and/or deci-
sion making. Some previous work has examined the impact of
affect on self-referential processing of personality traits (Fossati
et al., 2003; Phan et al., 2004; Moran et al., 2006; Gutchess
et al., 2007; Northoff et al., 2009). Most of this work has con-
cluded that rMPFC/CMS more generally is not modulated by
stimulus valence during self-referential processing (Fossati et al.,
2003; Phan et al., 2004; Moran et al., 2006; Gutchess et al., 2007;
Northoff et al., 2009). However, Moran et al. (2006) reported that
a region within subgenual cingulate cortex showed greater activ-
ity in response to positive relative to negative items—though only
when they were deemed highly self-relevant. Moreover, it should
be noted that both Enzi et al. (2009) and de Greck et al. (2008)
found notable overlap between regions engaged in self-referential
processing and those related to reward-related processing in the
context of a gambling task.
To our knowledge, no previous work has examined the impact
of self-referential decision difficulty on activity within regions
implicated in self-referential processing. This is despite influen-
tial criticism of the self-referential literature, which attributes
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much of the activity within MPFC to inferential/decision making
processes rather than self-referential processing per se (Legrand
and Ruby, 2009). Indeed, as noted by Northoff et al. (2011), the
“association of . . . task-specific requirements with the midline
structures during presentation of self- and non-self-specific stim-
uli remains to be investigated.” Decision/task difficulty has been
manipulated in a variety of tasks; e.g., fluid reasoning (Kalbfleisch
et al., 2007), time perception (Livesey et al., 2007), n-back task
(e.g., Lythe et al., 2012), and Stroop/Stroop-like tasks (see for
example Fellows and Farah, 2005; Grinband et al., 2011; Jasinska
et al., 2012; Sheth et al., 2012). This literature has relatively consis-
tently shown that dorsomedial frontal cortex increases activity as
decision/task difficulty increases (Paus et al., 1998; see Kalbfleisch
et al., 2007; Livesey et al., 2007; Grinband et al., 2011; Sheth et al.,
2012). This is consistent with many theories of cognitive control
that have stressed the importance of dmPFC, either as a per-
formance monitor or as a hub implementing cognitive control
(Shackman et al., 2011). Interestingly, Alexander and Brown have
more specifically modeled the role of dmPFC in decision-making
(the Predicted Response-Outcome (PRO) model; Alexander and
Brown, 2011). According to this model, the dmPFC maps the
prediction of various response-outcomes combinations: “This
suggests that mPFC may signal a greater number of predicted or
actual responses or outcomes instead of a response conflict per se,
as found previously with neurophysiological studies. The PRO
model simulates these findings [. . .] which yields an overall net
increase in signals predicting the correspondingly greater num-
ber of motor responses” (Alexander and Brown, 2011, p1341).
One of the predictions of this model is a stronger aggregate sig-
nal with increased number of response options. This prediction
was confirmed by Marsh et al. (2007) who showed that dmPFC
increased activity as a function of the number of differentially
reward options to choose between in a decision making paradigm
increased.
Following previous work (Craik et al., 1999; Kelley et al.,
2002), we examined participants’ BOLD responses when they
evaluated how well a personality trait described them or the
current US president. To minimize the effect of perceptual pro-
cesses on self-referential processes, the same personality traits
were used for the self and other condition. Both positive and
negative traits [as indexed respectively by high and low like-
ableness scores (Anderson, 1968)] were examined, allowing us
to determine the impact of valence on regions implicated in
self-referential processing. Decision difficulty was manipulated
by having traits that were either highly positive or negative (so
called high intensity items such as kind and cowardly) or mod-
erately positive or negative (so called low intensity items such as
deliberate and listless). We hypothesized that judgments of more
extreme items are easier than judgments of less extreme items
as the participant is more likely to have a prepotent judgment
associated with such an item; i.e., there would be less response
options associated with the item). This hypothesis was supported
by our pilot data; subjects demonstrated more response vari-
ability when judging low intensity items and were slower when
responding to low intensity items. On the basis of Moran and
colleagues (2006), we predicted that if we were to see valence
modulating activity during self/other-referential judgments, it
would be within subgenual vMPFC. On the basis of recent
modeling showing that increased potential response options are
associated with greater dMPFC activity (Alexander and Brown,
2011), we predicted that low intensity traits would be asso-
ciated with greater dMPFC activity than high intensity traits.
Moreover, we predicted that if decisionmaking processes underlie
the medial frontal cortical responses implicated in self-referential
processing, then the impact of referential target (self vs. other)
and decision difficulty (low intensity vs. high intensity) should
show considerable overlap. Alternatively, if they do not, then the
medial frontal cortical responses to referential target and deci-
sion difficulty should dissociate. The current study tests these
predictions.
METHODS
STUDY 1: REFERENTIAL PROCESSING
Participants
Twenty healthy adult volunteers (55% male; average age: 25.05 ±
3.90) were recruited from the community through newspa-
per ads and fliers. Participants were in good physical health
as confirmed by a complete physical exam, with no history of
any psychiatric illness as assessed by the DSM-IV (American
Psychiatric Association, 1994) criteria based on the Structural
Clinical Interview for DSM-IV Axis I disorders (SCID, First et al.,
1997). All participants gave written informed consent to partici-
pate in the study, which was approved by the National Institute
of Mental Health Institutional Review Board. IQ was assessed
with the Wechsler Abbreviated Scale of Intelligence (two-subtest
form, Wechsler, 1999) and demonstrated an average IQ of 118.79
(SD = 7.70).
Stimuli and behavioral procedure
Stimuli were selected from Anderson’s list of personality traits
(Anderson, 1968). This list has often been used in self-referential
paradigms (see for example Craik et al., 1999; Kelley et al., 2002).
Positive and negative words were selected (e.g., “capable” and
“mean”) of high and low intensity as indexed by the likeableness
scores (ranging from 0 = “least favorable or desirable” to 6 =
“most favorable or desirable,” Anderson, 1968) in the following
manner: Words on the extreme ends of the likeableness scale were
defined as high intense items, words with moderate likeableness
scores were defined as low intense items, words with low like-
ableness scores were defined as negative words and words with
high likeableness scores were defined as positive words. We sam-
pled words evenly throughout the list and only used words with a
standard deviation of the likeableness score below 1.5 (Table A1).
To avoid possible perceptual and categorical confounds, the same
stimuli were used for both the self and other condition. In addi-
tion, all four stimulus categories were matched on word length
and a second study (see “Personality Traits Questionnaire”) was
performed in which all personality traits were rated on valence,
arousal, familiarity, and imageability. Three separate ANOVAs
showed that words within each condition did differ on like-
ableness [F(3, 60) = 289.266, p < 0.001], but not on word length
[F(3, 60) = 0.545, p = 0.654] ormeaningfulness [F(3, 60) = 1.489,
p = 0.227]. Post-hoc tests indicated that the likeableness scores
for every condition differed significantly from the other three.
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High intensity negative words had a likeableness score of 1.15
(±3.64), low intensity negative words of 2.13 (±3.07), high inten-
sity positive words of 4.79 (±2.67) and low intensity positive
words of 3.67 (±5.28). Statements were either self-referential
(e.g., “I am capable”) or other-referential (e.g., “. . . is capa-
ble”). Participants were asked to judge, via button press, the
extent to which they agreed with the statement presented to
them. Following previous work (e.g., Kelley et al., 2002), the sub-
ject for “judging others” was the head of state at the time of
scanning.
Each trial involved the presentation of a statement for 3600ms
and the participant had to indicate the degree to which they
agreed (completely disagree, disagree, agree, completely agree)
with that statement during this time (otherwise it was counted
as a missed trial). Trials were followed by a 500ms fixation cross.
The task consisted of four runs. Each run consisted of 100 trials:
eight of each of the eight stimulus conditions and 36 fixation trials
to provide a baseline. Run order and trial order within runs were
randomized across participants.
MRI data analysis
MRI parameters. Participants were scanned during task perfor-
mance using a 3-T GE Signa scanner (GE Healthcare, Chalfont
St Giles, England). A total of 133 functional images per run were
taken with a gradient echo planar imaging (EPI) sequence (rep-
etition time = 2900ms; echo time = 27ms; 64_64 matrix; 90◦
flip angle; 24-cm field of view). A repetition time of 2900ms was
the shortest TR that allowed us full brain coverage with our cho-
sen voxel size. Whole brain coverage was obtained with 46 axial
slices (thickness, 3mm; in-plane resolution, 3.75 × 3.75mm). A
high-resolution anatomical scan (3-dimensional spoiled gradient
recalled acquisition in a steady state; repetition time = 7ms; echo
time = 2.984ms; 24-cm field of view; 12◦ flip angle; 128 axial
slices; thickness, 1.2mm; 256 × 192 matrix) in register with the
EPI data set was obtained covering the whole brain.
Imaging data preprocessing. Imaging data were preprocessed
and analyzed in AFNI (Cox, 1996). At the individual level, func-
tional images from the first 5 repetitions were collected before
equilibrium magnetization was reached and were discarded.
Functional images from the 4 time series were motion corrected
and spatially smoothed with a 6-mm full-width half-maximum
gaussian filter. The time series were normalized by dividing the
signal intensity of a voxel at each point by the mean signal inten-
sity of that voxel for each run and multiplying the result by
100. Resultant regression coefficients represented a percentage of
signal change from the mean.
Following this, the following eight regressors were gener-
ated: self-referential high intensity negative traits (Self-High-
Neg), self-referential low intensity negative traits (Self-Low-Neg),
self-referential high intensity positive traits (Self-High-Pos), self-
referential low intensity positive traits (Self-Low-Pos), other-
referential high intensity negative traits (Other-High-Neg),
other-referential low intensity negative traits (Other-Low-Neg),
other-referential high intensity positive traits (Other-High-Pos),
and other-referential low intensity positive traits (Other-Low-
Pos). These indicator functions were then convolved with a
gammavariate hemodynamic response function to account for
the slow hemodynamic response and used as regressors for our
first-level analyses. Linear regression modeling was performed
using the eight regressors described above plus regressors to
model a first-order baseline drift function. This produced a β-
coefficient and associated t statistic for each voxel and regressor.
The participants’ anatomical scans were individually registered to
the Talairach and Tournoux atlas (Talairach and Tournoux, 1988).
The individuals’ functional EPI data were then registered to their
Talairach anatomical scan within AFNI.
fMRI data analysis. Analysis was then performed on regres-
sion coefficients from individual subject analyses using a
2 (Referential target: self or other) × 2 (Valence: positive or
negative) × 2 (Intensity: low or high) repeated measures ANOVA.
All regions were corrected for multiple comparisons via ClustSim
(initial threshold: p < 0.001 corrected at p < 0.05 using an extent
threshold of 12 voxels). Group effects were masked using a brain
mask based on the mean normalized anatomical images of all
participants.
After observing hypothesized effects, post-hoc analyses were
performed to facilitate interpretations. For these analyses, average
percent signal change was measured across all voxels within each
ROI generated from the functional mask, and data were analyzed
using appropriate follow-up tests within SPSS.
Behavioral analysis. The evaluations made by the participants
were re-coded into numerical values (completely disagree= 1 ,
disagree = 2, agree = 3, completely agree = 4). Three 2
(Referential target: self or other) × 2 (Valence: positive or neg-
ative) × 2 (Intensity: low or high) repeated measures ANOVAs
were conducted on the participant’s judgment (their agreement
with the statement), their RT and response consistency (i.e.,
response variance for each of the 8 stimulus classes), respectively.
STUDY 2: PERSONALITY TRAITS QUESTIONNAIRE
A group of 12 participants rated valence, arousal, familiarity, and
imageability for every personality trait on a 7-point scale, using a
computerized questionnaire (Figure A1). Personality traits were
presented as words in random order. Each word was presented
until the participant had provided a rating response for that word.
Before filling out the questionnaire, participants read a manual
that provided explanations on item scoring (Text A1).
Four 2 (Intensity: high or low) × 2 (Valence: positive or nega-
tive) ANOVAs were conducted on the valence, arousal, familiarity,
and intensity ratings. In addition, we calculated the correlation
between the valence ratings and the original likeableness scores of
Anderson (Anderson, 1968).
RESULTS
STUDY 1: REFERENTIAL PROCESSING
Behavioral data (see Table 1)
A 2 (Referential target: self or other) × 2 (Valence: positive
or negative) × 2 (Intensity: low or high) repeated measures
ANOVA was conducted on the participants’ judgments. There
was a main effect of Valence [F(1, 20) = 331.94, p < 0.001].
Participants agreed more strongly with positive than negative
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Table 1 | Behavioral data: Means and standard deviations (in brackets) for judgment (i.e., the level of agreement with the statement ranging
from 1[completely disagree] to 4[completely agree]), RT, response variability (i.e., the variance in judgments), and the number of missed trials
by condition.
Self Other
Low (±SD) High (±SD) Low (±SD) High (±SD)
Judgment
Positive 2.76 (±0.15) 3.15 (±0.21) 2.71 (±0.16) 3.19 (±0.30)
Negative 2.14 (±0.27) 1.75 (±0.21) 2.04 (±0.19) 1.73 (±0.29)
RT (ms)
Positive 1827 (±248) 1741 (±261) 2044 (±283) 1910 (±290)
Negative 1914 (±261) 1791 (±223) 2118 (±248) 1936 (±287)
Response variability
Positive 0.50 (±0.25) 0.20 (±0.14) 0.51 (±0.31) 0.22 (±0.09)
Negative 0.50 (±0.33) 0.37 (±0.19) 0.33 (±0.24) 0.20 (±0.11)
No. Misses
Positive 0.67 (±1.20) 0.48 (±0.98) 1.05 (±1.28) 0.81 (±0.98)
Negative 1.10 (±1.30) 1.00 (±1.18) 1.48 (±1.78) 1.00 (±1.18)
traits. Additional to this was a Valence-by-Intensity interaction
[F(1, 20) = 184.48, p < 0.001]. Participants agreed more with
high intensity than low intensity positive statements (M[High-
Pos] = 2.86, M[Low-Pos] = 2.52; t(20) = 14.13, p < 0.001)
but with low intensity negative statements more than high
intensity negative statements (M[High-Neg] = 1.23, M[Low-
Neg] = 1.73; t(20) = 8.76, p < 0.001). There were no effects
of Referential target, or Intensity and no interaction effects of
Referential target-by-Valence, Referential target-by-Intensity or
Referential target-by-Intensity-by-Valence.
The ANOVA for participant RTs identified main effects of
Referential target, Intensity, and Valence [F(1, 20) = 23.04, 113.62,
6.26; p < 0.001, 0.001 and <0.05, respectively]. Participants
were faster when making judgments about the self relative to
the other (current US President), high intensity items relative
to low intensity items and positive traits relative to negative
traits. There were no significant interactions between any of the
variables.
The ANOVA for response variability (i.e., the variability in
response as a function of stimulus type) revealed a main effect
of Intensity [F(1, 20) = 29.93, p < 0.001]. Participants showed
greater response variability in their judgments of low relative to
high intensity items. In addition, there was a significant Valence-
by-Intensity interaction [F(1, 20) = 23.56, p < 0.001]. Response
variability was higher for negative relative to positive high inten-
sity judgments [t(20) = 5.24, p < 0.001] but response variability
for negative low intensity judgments did not differ from pos-
itive low intensity judgments[t(20) = 1.96, p = 0.064]. Finally,
there was also a significant Referential target-by-Valence inter-
action [F(1, 20) = 36.27, p < 0.001]. Response variability was
higher for self negative judgment trials relative to other nega-
tive trials [t(20) = 3.31, p < 0.003], but there was no difference
in response variability for self positive relative to other positive
trials [t(20) = 0.33, p = 0.743].
MRI results
The ANOVA conducted on the BOLD response data revealed
regions showing significant main effects of Referential target,
Valence, and Intensity as well as regions showing an interaction
of Valence-by-Intensity.
Main effect of Referential target. The main effect of Referential
target identified an extended region that included local max-
ima using a height threshold of p < 0.0001 (F = 23.78)
within vMPFC, dMPFC, rostral and dorsal ACC and ven-
tral and dorsolateral prefrontal cortex (dlPFC) (see Table 2
and Figure 1, regions in red). All these local maxima dis-
played a larger BOLD response when making judgments about
the self relative to the other. Notably though, only the dor-
sal part of the MPFC was significantly activated for both self-
referential and other-referential processing, whereas more ventral
regions (ACC and subgenual vMPFC) were deactivated dur-
ing other-referential processing and did not show significant
activation during self-referential processing (see Table 2 and
Figure 1).
Main effect of Intensity. A main effect of Intensity was observed
in dMPFC as well as an extensive region of lateral frontal cortex
(both inferior and superior) and bilateral anterior insula (AIC)
(see Figure 2, regions in green). In all cases, BOLD responses
were greater when making judgments about low relative to high
intensity items (see Table 3 and Figure 2).
Main effect of Valence. There was a main effect of valence
within bilateral posterior insula, of which the left posterior insula
was recruited more strongly for positive valenced traits and the
right posterior insula for negative valences traits (see Table 3).
A similar laterality effect was observed in bilateral primary and
somatosensory cortex (SI).
Interaction effect of Valence-by-Intensity. Bilateral SI displayed
a valence-by-intensity effect (see Table 3); right SI was recruited
for negatively valenced traits and for the negative traits most
strongly for those with a high intensity, left SI was recruited for
positive traits and also most strongly for those traits with a high
intensity.
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Table 2 | Main effect of Referential target.
Region BA L/R Coordinates of F Voxels Post-hoc tests
peak activation
x y z Self Other Self vs. Other
CENTRAL MIDLINE STRUCTURES
Middle cingulate cortex 31 Right 4.5 −22.5 44.5 116.8 5985 >Fix – Self > Other
Dorsal anterior cingulate 32 Right 4.5 7.5 38.5 34.8 >Fix >Fix Self > Other
r/v MPFC 24 Left −1.5 31.5 14.5 76.9 – <Fix Self > Other
Subgenual vMPFC 25 Right 4.5 10.5 −6.5 43.5 – <Fix Self > Other
Precuneus 7 Right 13.5 −55.5 50.5 23.8 24 >Fix Self > Other
LATERAL PREFRONTAL
dlPFC 10 Right 22.5 43.5 23.5 62.3 – <Fix Self > Other
dlPFC 6 Right 19.5 4.5 47.5 33.9 – <Fix Self > Other
dlPFC 9 Right 37.5 16.5 35.5 66.9 >Fix –
dlPFC 8 Left −22.5 19.5 44.5 44.9 136 >Fix – Self > Other
Inferior frontal gyrus 6 Right 52.5 −4.5 20.5 39.4 >Fix – Self > Other
Precentral gyrus 6 Right 46.5 −1.5 41.5 27.5 20 >Fix >Fix Self > Other
VISUAL CORTEX
Lingual gyrus 18 Right 10.5 −67.5 −0.5 95.7 315 >Fix >Fix Other > Self
Lingual gyrus 17 Left −4.5 −88.5 5.5 39.4 42 >Fix >Fix Self > Other
Lingual gyrus 18 Left −4.5 −73.5 5.5 49.5 99 >Fix >Fix Other > Self
CEREBELLUM
Cerebellum – Right 10.5 −52.5 −21.5 28.8 36 >Fix >Fix Self > Other
Cerebellum – Left −28.5 −40.5 −27.5 39.8 45 >Fix >Fix Self > Other
Cerebellum – Left −25.5 −61.5 −42.5 21.5 17 >Fix – Self > Other
Cerebellum – Right 16.5 −58.5 −45.5 20.6 16 >Fix – Self > Other
Inferior temporal gyrus 37 Right 49.5 −46.5 −12.5 22.4 26 >Fix – Self > Other
Posterior insula 13 Left −37.5 −31.5 20.5 75.1 >Fix – Self > Other
Caudate – Right 16.5 13.5 8.5 35.7 >Fix – Self > Other
Brainstem – Right 4.5 −16.5 −6.5 38.5 >Fix – Self > Other
Rolandic operculum 44 Right 46.5 −1.5 5.5 66.9 >Fix <Fix Self > Other
Middle temporal gyrus 37 Right 52.5 −58.5 2.5 19.7 22 – <Fix Self > Other
Superior temporal gyrus 42 Right 55.5 −31.5 14.5 73.7 – <Fix Self > Other
Postcentral gyrus ¾ Right 10.5 −37.5 65.5 20.1 20 – – Self > Other
Substantia nigra – Right 16.5 −22.5 −15.5 25.2 13 – – Self > Other
Thresholded at p = 0.001 uncorrected and a cluster extent threshold of 12 voxels. Gray text indicates local maxima using a height threshold of p < 0.0001 for
the largest cluster of 5985 voxels (F = 23.78). Results of post-hoc tests are reported for every region displaying Referential target effect (thresholded at p = 0.05
uncorrected).
Conjunction analysis. The degree of overlap was determined in
the regions identified by the main effect of Referential target and
those identified by the main effect of Intensity. Specifically, we
wished to determine whether the regions showing increased activ-
ity when making judgments about the self might overlap with
those implicated for more difficult judgments. This conjunction
analysis revealed minimal overlap between the Referential target
effect in dMPFC (6 out of 119 voxels). However, none of the other
regions displaying an effect of Intensity (dlPFC and bilateral AIC)
overlapped with regions displaying a Referential target effect.
STUDY 2: PERSONALITY TRAITS QUESTIONNAIRE
Given concerns regarding the valence, arousal, familiarity,
and imageability of the personality trait words, we asked 12
participants to provide these ratings for each of the words. We
then conducted four independent 2 (Intensity: high or low) × 2
(Valence: positive or negative) ANOVAs on the valence, arousal,
familiarity, and intensity ratings to determine whether the stimu-
lus categories were associated with significant differences in these
ratings. With respect to the valence ANOVA there was, unsur-
prisingly a highly significant effect [F(1, 60) = 178.87, p < 0.001].
Positive words [as identified by Anderson’s (1968) likeability rat-
ings] were rated as more positive in valence than negative words
(M[Pos] = 5.33, M[Neg] = 2.64; t(62) = 11.803, p < 0.001).
In addition, there was an unsurprising significant Valence-by-
Intensity interaction [F(1, 60) = 18.59, p < 0.001]; High nega-
tive words were rated as less positive than low negative words
[M = 2.30 vs. 2.97; t(30) = 2.50, p = 0.018] while high posi-
tive words were rated as more positive than low positive words
[M = 5.87 vs. 4.80; t(30) = 3.54, p = 0.001].
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FIGURE 1 | Main effect of Referential target. In red, regions showing an
effect of Referential target at p < 0.001 (F = 15.08). Regions in green display
an effect of Intensity at p < 0.001 (F = 15.08). Graphs depict percent signal
change compared to fixation for local maxima using a height threshold of
p < 0.0001 (F = 23.78, local maxima for Referential target are overlaid in
blue).
Due to concerns that there might be many possible relations
between “likeableness” (ratings provided by Anderson (1968) and
emotional valence (and arousal), we also conducted a correla-
tion analysis between the 12 participant’s valence ratings and the
likeableness scores provided by Anderson (1968). This revealed
a highly significant Pearson correlation of 0.929 (p < 0.001).
However, emotional valence ratings did not correlate with arousal
ratings (r = 0.059; n.s.).
With respect to arousal ratings, there was no main effect
of either Valence or Intensity or significant interaction. There
was, however, a main effect of Valence for familiarity ratings
[F(1, 60) = 4.52, p = 0.038]. Words in the positive category were
rated as more familiar relative to words in the negative cate-
gory (M[Pos] = 6.82, M[Neg] = 6.61; t(62) = 2.07, p < 0.042).
There was also a main effect of Intensity on the imageability rat-
ings [F(1, 60) = 4.27, p = 0.043]. High intensity words were rated
as more imageable than low intensity words (M[High] = 6.09,
M[Low] = 5.71; t(62) = 2.08, p < 0.041).
DISCUSSION
The present study investigated the influence of valence and deci-
sion difficulty on regions implicated in self-referential processing.
There were five main findings: First, ventral, rostral, and dorsal
parts of MPFC showed greater activity when subjects judged
traits about themselves relative to judging traits about the cur-
rent US President. Second, none of these regions showed sig-
nificant modulation by trait valence, though a significant main
effect of Valence was seen within bilateral posterior insula. Third,
although all regions in MPFC were relatively stronger recruited
for self, only dorsal parts were significantly activated for both self-
referential and other-referential processing. Fourth, with respect
to decision difficulty, both the bilateral AIC and the dMPFC
were more strongly recruited when participants were evaluat-
ing traits of low intensity. Fifth, with the exception of a very
small region of dMPFC, the regions showing a main effect of
Referential target did not overlap with those regions responsive
to a parameter relating to task difficulty in trait judgments; item
intensity.
Participants showed increased activity within ventral, rostral,
and dorsal parts of MPFC, right IFG and dlPFC when mak-
ing judgments about themselves relative to another individual
(the current US President). These findings are consistent with a
large body of previous work examining self-referential processing
(van der Meer et al., 2010; Northoff et al., 2011). A ventral-
dorsal division was observed in the MPFC: Post-hoc analyses
indicated that dorsal regions were significantly recruited during
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FIGURE 2 | Main effect of Intensity. In red, regions showing an effect of Referential target at p < 0.001 (F = 15.08). Regions in green display an effect of
Intensity at p < 0.001 (F = 15.08). Graphs depict percent signal change compared to fixation for regions displaying an effect of Intensity.
both self- and other-referential processing (albeit more so during
self-referential processing), whereas ventral parts of the MPFC
did not show significant activations (over baseline) when either
engaged by either self- or other-referential processing. Instead,
vMPFC showed deactivation during other-referential processing.
In short, the observed Referential target effect in dorsal regions
was due to a stronger activation during self while the Referential
target effect in ventral regions was due to a deactivation when
making judgments about the other. This pattern of activations
(at or below baseline during self-referential processing and even
more below baseline during other-referential processing) has
been observed in many studies employing similar paradigms
(Kelley et al., 2002; Heatherton et al., 2006; D’Argembeau et al.,
2007; Gutchess et al., 2007; Jenkins and Mitchell, 2011) though
not by all (Kircher et al., 2000; D’Argembeau et al., 2005;
Vanderwal et al., 2008; Moran et al., 2011; Sul et al., 2011). It
has been argued that high vMPFC activity during rest poten-
tially represents self-reflective processes that are reduced when
representing the other (e.g., Kelley et al., 2002; D’Argembeau
et al., 2005; Heatherton et al., 2006; Jenkins and Mitchell, 2011).
Of course, this assumes that self-reflective processes are rapidly
engaged in the absence of task relevant stimuli and that these are
comparable (albeit non-conscious and non-task driven) to those
initiated when asking the individual to engage in self-referential
judgments.
Previous work has examined the impact of affect on self-
referential processing of personality traits (Fossati et al., 2003;
Moran et al., 2006; Gutchess et al., 2007). While there is notable
overlap between regions engaged in self-referential processing
and those associated to reward related processing during per-
formance of a gambling task (de Greck et al., 2008; Enzi et al.,
2009), there has been little evidence of significant modulation by
valence when engaged in self-referential processing. One study
reported an interaction between self-referential processing of
personality traits and valence within a more ventral region of
MPFC (Moran et al., 2006). However, that has not been seen
subsequently (Fossati et al., 2003; Phan et al., 2004; Gutchess
et al., 2007; Northoff et al., 2009) and nor was it seen here.
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Table 3 | Brain regions displaying an effect of Intensity, Valence, and Valence-by-Intensity.
Region BA L/R Coordinates of F Voxels Post-hoc tests
peak activation
x y z
Intensity Low High Low vs. High
dMPFC 8 Left −4.5 19.5 47.5 52.4 119 >Fix >Fix Low > High
dlPFC 6 Left −31.5 4.5 50.5 29.2 153 >Fix >Fix Low > High
AIC
45 Left −49.5 31.5 5.5 49.9 119 >Fix >Fix Low > High
47 Right 37.5 22.5 −0.5 21.4 12 – – Low > High
Valence Pos Neg Pos vs. Neg
Posterior insula
13 Left −34.5 −19.5 14.5 22.8 15 – <Fix Pos > Neg
13 Right 46.5 −19.5 14.5 31.8 30 – >Fix Neg > Pos
Primary somato-sensory cortex
3 Left −34.5 −28.5 50.5 152.8 683 >Fix – Pos > Neg
3 Right 34.5 −25.5 50.5 84.5 664 – >Fix Neg > Pos
Cerebellum
– Left −16.5 −49.5 −18.5 44.3 80 >Fix >Fix Neg > Pos
– Right 16.5 −49.5 −12.5 55.7 150 >Fix >Fix Pos > Neg
Middle cingulate gyrus 6 Left −10.5 −13.5 50.5 27.6 58 >Fix <Fix Pos > Neg
Thalamus – Left −16.5 −22.5 5.5 37.1 23 >Fix >Fix Pos > Neg
Valency-by-Intensity
Primary somato-sensory cortex
2 Right 40.5 −25.5 47.5 39.2 288
3 Left −31.5 −25.5 44.5 33.8 97
Thresholded at p = 0.001 uncorrected and a cluster extent threshold of 12 voxels. Results of post-hoc tests are reported for every region displaying an Intensity or
Valence effect (thresholded at p = 0.05 uncorrected).
On the basis of these results, we assume that emotional respond-
ing plays a relatively minor role in self-referential processing,
even if affect information has an impact (as evidenced by the
judgment, RT and response variability behavioral data). Given
the absence of any emotional response at the neural level, we
speculate that this affect information is represented in semantic
systems that are engaged when making self- and other-referential
judgments.
But what are the processes engaged by self/other-referential
processing tasks? It could be argued that such tasks are vari-
ants of standard sentence verification tasks (e.g., “A canary is a
bird”) where self-referential trials involve the subject presumably
“knowing” while in other-referential trials they can only “guess”
it (anonymous reviewer’s suggestion). Certainly, sentence verifi-
cation tasks elicit activity within dorsomedial and lateral frontal
cortices (Sanjuan et al., 2010). However, the activity of these
regions is greater for sentences which compare words with less
shared features than for those comparing words with more shared
features (Raposo et al., 2012). Moreover, findings for the concep-
tually similar context verification task reported that medial and
lateral frontal cortices showed greater activity during ambiguous
relative to unambiguous trials (Hoenig and Scheef, 2009). Since
self-referential statements would appear to have more shared fea-
tures and are less ambiguous than other-referential judgments,
one might have expected them to be associated with associated
with less activity within dmPFC than other-referential statements
on the basis of this literature. Given that in this study they are
not, the hypothesis that self-referential processing tasks are vari-
ants of standard sentence verification tasks where self-referential
trials involve the subject presumably “knowing” the answer while
in other referential trials they can only “guess” the answer, is not
supported.
In the current study, decision difficulty was manipulated via
trait intensity. In pilot work, participants found judgments con-
cerning high intensity to be significantly easier than judgments
concerning low intensity traits. Moreover, as was seen here, RT
and variance in given responses was lower for high intensity traits
relative to low intensity traits. Recent modeling work of the role of
dmPFC in decision-making has suggested that this region maps
the various response-option combinations elicited by a stimu-
lus such that the greater the number of options, the greater the
dmPFC will be seen (Alexander and Brown, 2011). This is consis-
tent with previous findings in the decision making literature (e.g.,
Marsh et al., 2007). As such this model predicted that low inten-
sity traits would be associated with greater dMPFC activity than
high intensity traits, a prediction confirmed by the current results.
It is also noteworthy that regions of lateral frontal and AIC were
also more responsive to low relative to high intensity traits. This is
consistent with suggestions that the response of dMPFC includes
the organization of attentional resources via lateral frontal cortex
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and behavioral change via inferior frontal cortex/anterior insula
cortex (Miller and Cohen, 2001; Budhani et al., 2007).
If this form of decision-making process, response outcome
tracking, was related to self-referential processing then one would
expect that the impact of Referential target (self vs. other) and
decision difficulty (low intensity vs. high intensity) should show
considerable overlap. However, this was only minimally seen (5%
of the region identified by the main effect of decision difficulty
was also shown to be responsive to referential target). Instead,
our alternative hypothesis was supported; i.e., that largely sep-
arable regions of dMPFC are implicated in self-referential as
opposed to decision difficulty (even decision difficulty concerning
self-referential traits).
It could be argued that if the PRO models account of dmPFC
was an account of this region’s role in self-referential processing,
then there should be greater activity within dmPFC for other-
referential rather than self-referential judgments. This would be
because participants presumably “know” (and thus have less
response options) the degree to which it corresponds to the self
but can only guess with respect to the other individual (anony-
mous reviewer’s suggestion). However, it should be noted that
there was no significant main effect of referential target with
respect to response variability (see also Table 1). As such the
PRO model should not necessarily predict differential dmPFC
activity as a function of referential target. Of course, given this
it’s not clear that the model should predict greater activity for
self relative to other either. As such, PRO cannot be consid-
ered a complete model of dmPFC activity (a large region of
prefrontal cortex). However, it is a useful model of one of the func-
tions of this region. Self-referential processing is another of these
functions.
Recently a distinction has been drawn between internally and
externally guided decision making (Nakao et al., 2012). It is
argued that “instances of decision-making in which no correct
answer based on external circumstances is available for the sub-
ject (internally guided decision-making) . . . are usually made . . .
where the answer depends on the subject’s own, i.e., internal,
preferences rather than on external, i.e., circumstantial, criteria.”
(Nakao et al., 2012, p. 1). Similar distinctions have been made
before (e.g., Lieberman and Eisenberger, 2005; Volz et al., 2006).
These reviews suggest that internally guided decision-making
relies on MPFC (Lieberman and Eisenberger, 2005; Volz et al.,
2006; Nakao et al., 2012), PCC and temporal cortex (Lieberman
and Eisenberger, 2005; Nakao et al., 2012). A similar neural net-
work showed greater activity during self-referential processing
relative to other-referential processing in the current study. This
could be taken to suggest that self-referential processing relies
more on processes implicated in internally generated decision-
making than other-referential processing; it is possible that one
utilizes ones preferences more for self and external, circumstan-
tial criteria more for other. However, as with all reverse inferences,
this suggestion is open to challenge without direct empirical
manipulation.
Two caveats should be considered with respect to the current
results. First, study 2 indicated that our positive words were more
familiar to the participants than the negative words. However,
our relative absence of valence findings, beyond somatosensory
regions, suggests that this confound had a limited impact on
the BOLD response. Second, study 2 also indicated that our
high intensity items had a higher imageability score than our
low intensity items. Importantly, however, previous studies of
the neural correlates of imageability (Bedny and Thompson-
Schill, 2006) or contrasting concrete vs. abstract words (Jessen
et al., 2000; Binder et al., 2005) have consistently implicated
more lateral regions of superior frontal cortex than those impli-
cated in the task difficulty intensity effect seen here. In addition,
they have consistently implicated regions of parietal cortex and
precuneus—neither of which was effected by intensity level in
the current study. In short, it appears unlikely that our Intensity
effects can be attributed to imageability differences of the word
categories. There were no significant item effects on arousal and
thus differences in this variable would not appear to be usefully
explanatory regarding the current data.
Considerable work has been conducted on self-referential
processing implicating a consistent network of brain regions
including CMS, as well as inferior frontal cortex, insula and the
temporal poles. However, much is still unknown about the dif-
ferent computations underlying self-referential processing and
how they are implemented. In this study, we have examined the
impact of two variables on regions implicated in self-referential
processing: valence and decision difficulty. It will be impor-
tant to examine the impact of other manipulations on these
systems also.
In summary, the current study implicates a network of
CMS in self-referential processing. Some regions, in particular
dACC, are implicated in self- and other-referential processing
(albeit showing stronger responses when self- relative to other-
processing). Potentially, this represents executive organization of
semantic representations, such that concepts can be examined
with respect to the self or the other. Other regions, in partic-
ular vMPFC and subgenual ACC, may also be implicated in
both self- and other-referential processing. However they are
associated with significant deactivation during other-referential
processing and non-significant activation during self-referential
processing. While this may reflect self-referential processing dur-
ing rest (e.g., Kelley et al., 2002; D’Argembeau et al., 2005;
Heatherton et al., 2006; Jenkins and Mitchell, 2011), this assumes
that self-reflective processes are rapidly engaged in the absence
of task relevant stimuli (given the event-related design) and
that they are comparable (albeit non-conscious and non-task
driven) to those initiated when asking the individual to engage
in self-referential judgments. Importantly, while there have been
challenges that dMPFC activity during self-referential processing
may reflect general inferential/decision making processes rather
than self-referential processing per se (Legrand and Ruby, 2009),
the current data suggest that regions of dMPFC implicated in
trait decision difficulty (i.e., more general decision making pro-
cessing) are independent of those implicated in self-referential
processing.
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APPENDIX
TEXT A1: WORD RATING QUESTIONNAIRE
GENERAL INSTRUCTIONS
Thank you for participating in this study. We would like to know
how you respond to certain words. For each word we will ask you
four questions. Please rate each question on a scale of 1–7. When
you press a number, the program will immediately jump to the
next question. When making your ratings, try to be as accurate
as possible, but do not spend too much time on any one word.
We will now go over each question with two example words and
explain how you should rate the questions. You can always refer
to this information in the paper copy next to you.
INSTRUCTIONS QUESTION 1
Underneath the question you will see a set of figures called SAM,
and you will be using these figures to rate how you felt while
reading each word. For this question, SAM shows the feelings
Unhappy vs. Happy, which ranges from a frown to a smile. At one
extreme of this scale, you are happy, pleased, satisfied, contented,
hopeful. When you feel completely happy you should indicate this
by selecting the figure at the right. The other end of the scale is
when you feel completely unhappy, annoyed, unsatisfied, melan-
cholic, despaired, or bored. You can indicate feeling completely
unhappy by selecting the figure on the left. The figures also allow
you to describe intermediate feelings of pleasure, by selecting any
of the other pictures. If you feel completely neutral, neither happy
nor sad, select the figure in the middle. There are a total of 7 pos-
sible points along each rating scale that you can select to indicate
the extent to which you felt happy or unhappy. You select the pic-
ture by pressing the number that is written underneath the picture
(adapted from Bradley and Lang, 1999).
INSTRUCTIONS QUESTION 2
For this question, SAM shows the feelings Calm vs. Exited. At
one extreme of this scale you are stimulated, excited, frenzied, jit-
tery, wide-awake, or aroused. When you feel completely aroused,
select the figure at the left of the row. Now look at the other end
of the excited-calm scale, which is the completely opposite feel-
ing. Here you would feel completely relaxed, calm, sluggish, dull,
sleepy, or unaroused. Indicate feeling calm by selecting the fig-
ure at the right of the row. As with the happy–unhappy scale, you
can represent intermediate levels of excitedness or calmness by
selecting any of the other figures. If you are not excited nor at
all calm, select the figure in the middle of the row (adapted from
Bradley and Lang, 1999).
INSTRUCTIONS QUESTION 3
For this question we ask you to rate how familiar you are with this
word. You can rate the familiarity on a 7-point scale, where a 1
indicates that the word is unknown to you. A rating of 7 indicates
that the word is familiar to you and its meaning well known. A
rating of 4 indicates that you definitely recognize the word, but do
not know its meaning. The ratings 2, 3, 5, and 6 are used to indi-
cate variations between these response categories. For example, a
rating of 3 indicates that you might have seen the word before,
while a rating of 5 indicates that you recognize the word but have
only the vaguest notion of its meaning. You can indicate the word
familiarity by pressing the appropriate number on the keyboard
(adapted from Nusbaum et al., 1984).
INSTRUCTIONS QUESTION 4
Words differ in their capacity to arousemental images of things or
events. Some words arouse a sensory experience, such as a men-
tal picture or sound, very quickly and easily whereas other words
may do so only with difficulty (i.e., after a long delay) or not at
all.
The purpose of this question is to rate the ease or difficulty
with which this word arouses mental images. Any word, that in
your estimation arouses a mental image (i.e., a mental picture
or sound, or other sensory experience) very quickly and easily
should be given a high imagery rating (at the upper end of the
numerical scale). Any word that arouses a mental image with dif-
ficulty or not at all should be given a low imagery rating (at the
lower end of the numerical scale). For example think of the word
“BUSY.” “BUSY” would probably arouse an image (e.g., of some-
one running around all the time) relatively easily and would be
rated as high. “INDIVIDUALISTIC” would probably do so with
difficulty and be rated as low imagery.
Because words tend to make you think of other words as asso-
ciates, it is important that your ratings not be based on this, and
that you judge only the ease with which you get a mental image of
an object or event in response to each word.
Your imagery ratings will be made on a 1–7 scale. A value of 1
will indicate a low imagery rating, and a value of 7 will indicate
a high imagery rating. Values of 2–6 will indicate inter- mediate
ratings (adapted from Cortese and Fugett, 2004).
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Table A1 | Words used in paradigm.
Condition Likeableness Meaningfullness Valence Arousal Familiarity Imageability
Thoughtful Pos-High 529 376 6 2.83 6.92 5.75
Kind Pos-High 520 368 6.42 2.67 7 6.08
Good-humored Pos-High 507 366 2.42 4.75 6.92 6.92
Well-spoken Pos-High 501 332 5.75 3.67 6.75 6
Quick-witted Pos-High 494 356 6 4.75 6.58 5.42
Brilliant Pos-High 490 366 5 3.75 6.67 4.58
Bright Pos-High 483 362 6.67 5.42 6.92 6.25
Alert Pos-High 480 370 5 3.25 6.25 4.75
Spirited Pos-High 477 342 5.75 4.33 6.75 5.83
Capable Pos-High 471 370 2.17 3.58 6.92 6.42
Accurate Pos-High 464 336 5.25 2.58 6.75 5.58
Generous Pos-High 459 370 6.58 4.08 6.92 6.5
Inventive Pos-High 453 356 6 4.58 6.75 6.08
Attentive Pos-High 450 372 2.42 4.92 6.67 6.67
Amiable Pos-High 446 348 5.5 3.75 6.92 6.17
Composed Pos-High 439 340 2.83 3.5 6.42 5.58
Agreeable Pos-Low 434 354 4.83 4.92 6.83 6.42
Decisive Pos-Low 427 360 4.42 3.83 6.75 4.83
Light-hearted Pos-Low 424 324 5.67 3.08 6.92 5.67
Outgoing Pos-Low 412 364 6.33 5.08 6.92 6.67
Hopeful Pos-Low 406 328 6.25 4 6.92 5.17
Orderly Pos-Low 399 360 5.5 3.58 7 6.58
Candid Pos-Low 389 316 6.17 3.83 6.83 5.83
Soft-spoken Pos-Low 380 354 4.08 2.42 6.83 6.58
Sentimental Pos-Low 371 360 5.42 2.75 6.83 6.17
Subtle Pos-Low 365 320 4.17 2.75 6.83 4.75
Talkative Pos-Low 352 390 5.5 4.42 6.92 6.83
Deliberate Pos-Low 345 344 3.25 5 6.83 6.5
Forward Pos-Low 318 346 6.08 4.25 6.5 6.58
Conservative Pos-Low 295 352 2.25 4 6.92 6.42
Unlucky Pos-Low 280 360 2.25 3.75 7 5.92
Naive Pos-Low 270 360 3.5 3.25 6.75 5.92
Extravagant Neg-Low 263 360 2 4.83 7 6.67
Daydreamer Neg-Low 260 368 5.25 3.75 6.83 5.25
Self-conscious Neg-Low 249 366 3.08 3.58 6.92 6
Conformist Neg-Low 241 372 3.5 3.42 6.92 6.5
Overcautious Neg-Low 229 360 2.67 3.5 6.75 5.42
Forgetful Neg-Low 224 386 4.67 3.67 6.75 5.83
Spendthrift Neg-Low 221 354 3.5 3.08 5.08 4.08
Fearful Neg-Low 214 370 3 3.67 6.92 5.5
Sad Neg-Low 209 358 1.33 2.83 7 7
Demanding Neg-Low 203 362 5.17 5.25 6.67 6.92
Obstinate Neg-Low 197 348 3.33 3.25 4.58 3.58
Unobservant Neg-Low 194 366 3 3.17 6.33 5
Illogical Neg-Low 186 354 2.5 3.83 6.58 4.75
Unwise Neg-Low 180 358 2.42 3 6.83 5.17
Listless Neg-Low 169 332 3 3.5 5.5 4.92
Pessimistic Neg-Low 164 376 1.58 4.08 6.92 6.17
Smug Neg-High 161 304 2.83 3.67 6.33 5.25
Hot-headed Neg-High 158 362 2.25 4.83 6.75 6.5
Sloppy Neg-High 153 376 2.92 3.75 6.92 6.83
Unruly Neg-High 150 324 2.58 4.33 6.5 5.75
(Continued)
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Table A1 | Continued
Condition Likeableness Meaningfullness Valence Arousal Familiarity Imageability
Uninteresting Neg-High 146 372 2.58 2.42 6.92 6.08
Careless Neg-High 140 374 5.33 2.67 6.92 6.42
Irrational Neg-High 130 354 2.67 4.5 6.83 5.58
Gossipy Neg-High 119 376 5.67 3.58 7 5.17
Cowardly Neg-High 110 374 4.83 2.67 6.92 6.67
Irresponsible Neg-High 106 372 2.25 4.08 6.83 6.25
Humorless Neg-High 101 362 2.08 2.83 6.58 5.67
Ill-mannered Neg-High 95 374 2.25 4 6.83 5.83
Belligerent Neg-High 86 332 6.17 4.33 6.92 6.67
Heartless Neg-High 78 350 1.67 3.58 6.92 6.5
Insincere Neg-High 66 364 1.75 3.67 6.58 5.5
Mean Neg-High 37 356 1.75 4.42 6.92 6.67
Likeableness and meaningfulness scores as reported by Anderson (1968). Condition as used in the current paradigm. Valence, arousal, familiarity, and imageability
scores as reported by an independent group of 12 participants.
FIGURE A1 | Word rating questionnaire Study 2. Screen shots of the four questions (Q1, Q2, Q3, and Q4) that were asked for each personality trait.
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